Reflections on Ethereum Governance Following the 3074 Saga
This article, based on the personal experience of Derek Chiang, the CEO of ZeroDev, provides an objective analysis of the current governance model and its pain points in the Ethereum ecosystem. The article highlights the discrepancy between the roadmap determined by researchers and the perspectives of client development teams like Geth. It also emphasizes Vitalik’s role as the de facto CTO of Ethereum. Chiang acknowledges Vitalik’s contributions but suggests improvements to the governance model for the Ethereum community to consider.
If you are unfamiliar with the recent events surrounding Ethereum’s Account Abstraction (AA), here is a brief recap: EIP-3074, a proposal that would introduce two new opcodes to the EVM, allowing Ethereum EOA accounts to have a near-native AA experience, was recently approved by Ethereum core developers for inclusion in the upcoming hard fork, “Pectra.” However, many members of the ERC-4337 community, particularly the proponents of ERC-4337, strongly opposed EIP-3074, citing concerns about security vulnerabilities and its incompatibility with Ethereum’s AA roadmap. The existing roadmap explicitly centered around ERC-4337 and a similar proposal, EIP-7560, also known as “nativeAA.”
In early May, Vitalik proposed EIP-7702 as an alternative to EIP-3074, striking a balance between 4337 and 3074. This proposal aims to provide an AA experience for EOA users while maintaining compatibility with ERC-4337 and the ultimate AA solution, EIP-7560. Currently, Ethereum core developers are considering EIP-7702, and preliminary discussions and community sentiment indicate that EIP-7702 is likely to replace EIP-3074.
While Chiang expresses satisfaction with this outcome, he believes there could have been a better way to achieve it, suggesting that a more efficient governance process could have saved time and led to faster results. In this article, Chiang aims to identify the problems in the governance process, propose a framework for thinking about Ethereum governance, and provide recommendations for improving the governance model to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Chiang argues that the root cause of governance issues lies in the roadmap. He introduces the concept of a “roadmap” as an influential yet often unrecognized governance power source in Ethereum. He illustrates this by discussing the 3074-4337-7702 governance incident, which exemplifies how the existing roadmap’s power overrides the authority of ACD (All Core Developers), the formal governance process for Ethereum protocol updates. While ACD is responsible for making decisions regarding protocol updates, another governance power source, the roadmap, holds greater influence on critical Ethereum matters such as AA and scalability. Chiang notes that the roadmap lacks a formal approval process, and researchers behind the roadmap must actively promote it to gain legitimacy and support from Ethereum core developers.
Chiang argues that Vitalik plays a unique role in Ethereum governance, akin to that of a Chief Technology Officer (CTO) in a large tech company. He points out that as Ethereum has grown, it is impossible for Vitalik to be involved in every technical decision. Decision-making processes become decentralized as the company expands, with specialized teams in various product/business areas having autonomy in determining solution details. Additionally, the CTO may not be an expert in all or any of the topics discussed.
Chiang concludes by highlighting the importance of recognizing and addressing the governance issues stemming from the roadmap. He suggests that by acknowledging and resolving these underlying problems, Ethereum can avoid governance accidents and the subsequent blaming of parties involved. Chiang’s insights provide valuable considerations for improving Ethereum’s governance model and serve as a reference for both the Ethereum and Bitcoin communities.
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The article was translated and compiled by Geek Web3 based on Derek Chiang’s original article titled “Reflections on Ethereum Governance Following the 3074 Saga.” Derek Chiang, as the CEO of ZeroDev, offers his perspective on the matter, highlighting the pain points of Ethereum’s current governance model from the standpoint of an AA ecosystem project founder. He precisely points out one of Ethereum’s governance contradictions, which arises from the discrepancy between the roadmap determined by researchers and the perspectives of client development teams like Geth. Vitalik, in his role as Ethereum’s de facto CTO, plays a decisive role in resolving such contradictions.
[img]There may be engineers within a company who are more skilled than the CTO in specific areas. Therefore, when discussing technical details, it is often the engineers who make the final decision.
However, the CTO sets the technical vision for the company. The execution of the vision is left to the developers.
While this is not a perfect analogy, I believe it accurately summarizes Vitalik’s role in the Ethereum ecosystem. Vitalik does not participate in every technical decision — and he cannot. He is also not the top expert in every field. But he has overwhelming influence over the roadmap that determines all critical Ethereum solutions (scaling, AA, POS, etc.), not just because of his technical expertise, but also because he is the ultimate judge of whether the roadmap aligns with the Ethereum vision (his vision).
If I were to argue that Vitalik is the CTO of Ethereum, it wouldn’t be controversial enough. So here comes the most controversial part: we should embrace Vitalik as the CTO.
As the founder of a startup company, I believe that every successful product must have a coherent long-term vision. Yes, Ethereum is also a “product” because it solves real problems for real users. And a coherent vision must be formulated by a small number of people, such as the founders of a startup, usually with only one founder.
The beauty of Ethereum is that, despite being a very complex system with so many components, all these components fit together perfectly to create a well-functioning decentralized computer that settles billions of dollars’ worth of transactions every day.
We have reached where we are today not through the design of some committee, but because Vitalik, with his foresight and leadership, has played an active role in building the coherent and beautiful Ethereum. Ethereum is Vitalik’s idea proposed in 2015, and it still is.
Of course, this is not meant to diminish the contributions of other researchers and engineers who have contributed the most to Ethereum’s achievements today. However, this is not contradictory because Ethereum is the realization of Vitalik’s vision, which is several orders of magnitude bigger than anyone else’s.
To be honest, can you complain about this? When you are attracted to the openness, censorship resistance, and innovation speed of the Ethereum ecosystem, have you ever complained that it originated from Vitalik’s vision? Maybe you haven’t complained because you haven’t thought about it that way — but now that you have, do you really mind this issue?
But you might say, what about decentralization? How can we say Ethereum is decentralized if one person has such overwhelming power over it?
To answer this question, we must refer back to this classic article by Vitalik about the meaning of decentralization. The article outlines three types of decentralization:
Architectural decentralization: How many nodes can fail before the system stops functioning?
Logical decentralization: Can the subsystems of the system develop independently while keeping the overall system functioning, or do they need to be tightly coordinated?
Political decentralization: How many people or organizations ultimately control the system?
According to these definitions, Ethereum is clearly decentralized architecturally, and it can be argued that it is also logically decentralized because its components lack strong coupling (e.g., consensus layer and execution layer).
Regarding political decentralization, the good news is that no individual or organization can shut down Ethereum, not even Vitalik. However, some may argue that the degree of political decentralization in Ethereum is not as high as people imagine because Vitalik plays a significant role in shaping Ethereum’s vision and roadmap.
However, I believe that if we want Ethereum to continue innovating, we must accept Vitalik as the de facto CTO, even if it means sacrificing some political decentralization.
If Ethereum were to become “frozen” like Bitcoin, almost immutable, then Vitalik might retire directly. But before we reach that final step, it is crucial to have an authority that is respected by all parties, a trusted authority that can make judgments on technical decisions based not only on the superiority of the proposed technical solutions but also on whether these decisions align with Ethereum’s vision.
If we don’t have someone like Vitalik, there are only two possible outcomes, vividly illustrated by the story of 3074:
The Ethereum governance process may fall into an endless deadlock, where both conflicting sides refuse to compromise, and no progress can be made, as demonstrated by the stalemate in the 3074 debate before Vitalik intervened.
Or Ethereum may become a Frankenstein-like “monster” with a lack of coherent design. 3074 and 4337 mentioned earlier may not find a compromise, ultimately leading to the complete separation of the AA ecosystem into two incompatible parallel spaces.
After considering the above, we are starting to outline a complete model of Ethereum governance. However, there is an obvious omission in our discussion: the community.
If Vitalik defines Ethereum’s vision, researchers define the roadmap, and core developers implement the roadmap, what role does the community play? Certainly, they don’t just sit idly, right?
Fortunately, the community actually plays the most crucial role. The reason is that before there is a vision, there are values. We come together as a community because we unite around certain values, and Vitalik’s vision must ultimately align with these values to maintain the support of the community.
Everyone in the Ethereum community believes in having a decentralized computer that is accessible to everyone, uncensored, and trustlessly neutral, which benefits the world. We maintain and affirm these values every day through the work we do on Ethereum, providing legitimacy to the vision, roadmap, and code proposed by Vitalik, researchers, and core developers.
The VVRC Model of Ethereum Governance
Therefore, here is the complete mental model of Ethereum governance: Values ⇒ Vision ⇒ Roadmap ⇒ Client, abbreviated as VVRC:
V == Values == Community;
V == Vision == Vitalik;
R == Roadmap == Researchers;
C == Client == Core developers;
They play the following roles together:
The community rallies around specific values.
Vitalik expresses a vision that aligns with these values.
Researchers formulate a roadmap based on the vision.
Core developers implement clients based on the roadmap.
Of course, reality is much more complex than any simple model can capture. In fact, core developers are the only ones who can truly “vote” on any proposal by making changes to the client code. Vitalik and other researchers only serve as advisors, and sometimes their opinions are not accepted by core developers, as evident in the approval of EIP-3074.
That being said, I believe the VVRC model reasonably captures how Ethereum’s governance model operates in typical circumstances, and we need to “debug” this process to prevent accidents like EIP-3074 from happening again.
Now that we have a mental model of how Ethereum’s governance process works, here are a few ideas to improve the governance process:
Increase the visibility of the discussion progress for EIPs under consideration. The entire community should not be “surprised” by the acceptance of an EIP, and unexpected approval processes like the one for EIP-3074 should not occur.
The “status” of EIPs on the EIP website does not currently reflect their status in the ACD process. That’s why it still says EIP-3074 is in the “Final” status, despite core developers voting to approve it, and there is no indication that it was considered for approval from the beginning.
Ideally, when an EIP is about to be accepted, the Ethereum Foundation should loudly announce the result on social media to increase community awareness.
Sometimes core developers may underestimate the impact of a specific EIP on downstream projects and users. The 3074 and 4337 communities are examples of this. Due to time constraints and the need for coordination across time zones, meetings often only allow “relevant parties” to speak.
However, it would be meaningful to occasionally allocate speaking time to community members to comment on the impact of certain EIP proposals on downstream projects after they are approved.
If researchers feel that their opinions are not being accepted by core developers, as in the case of 4337, they can involve community members to strengthen their arguments.
It is crucial for core developers and researchers to recognize each other’s role as part of Ethereum’s governance power, even though they have different levels of influence. Core developers have the power to modify and update Ethereum clients, giving them the ability to “vote” by changing the protocol itself. Researchers usually have more public support when it comes to changes and interpretations of the roadmap, thanks to their active discussions and writings.
When conflicts arise between these two forces, core developers may tend to override the opinions of researchers, as seen in the overturning of the 4337 team’s dissent. However, such overrides can lead to conflicts and instability when the two forces clash, as demonstrated by the dramatic events that followed the approval of 3074.
Similarly, when faced with resistance, researchers may tend to give up cooperation with core developers. In my opinion, this is also one of the reasons for establishing the RIP process and why the native AA (7560) is now primarily promoted as RIP rather than EIP.
While it is beneficial to experiment with controversial protocol updates on L2 to L1, we should not see RIP as a substitute for participating in the EIP governance process. Researchers must continue to work with core developers until both sides’ values fully align with the roadmap.
The 3074/7702 incident revealed the true workings of Ethereum governance — besides the explicit governance power of the EIP/ACD process driven by core developers, there is also implicit governance power driven by researchers in the form of the roadmap. When these powers misalign, we see deadlocks and tensions, and it may require another force — Vitalik — to break the balance in some way.
Then, we propose that Vitalik represents a unique force, the “vision” of Ethereum, which is the basis for the legitimacy of any roadmap. We compare Vitalik to a CTO of a large company and acknowledge that his role as a pseudo-CTO is necessary for Ethereum to maintain its innovative pace and prevent Ethereum from becoming a “Frankenstein” stitched together.
Finally, we present the VVRC model as a description of the Ethereum governance model: Values (Community) ⇒ Vision (Vitalik) ⇒ Roadmap (Researchers) ⇒ Client (Core developers). We then propose various methods to “debug” this model.
Ethereum governance is the “machine that makes machines” — to make Ethereum work correctly, we must govern it properly. Therefore, the 3074 incident provides a valuable case for governance accidents, and I hope the Ethereum community can learn useful lessons from it to improve future Ethereum governance processes.